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Who Put Out the Lamps?: Thoughts on
International Law and the Coming of
World War I
Robert A. Friedlander*
The lamps are going out all over
Europe; we shall not see them lit
again in our lifetime.
-Sir Edward Grey
Almost seventy years ago an act of international terrorism-
the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand-
literally triggered the outbreak of the First World War. More
than six and one-half decades later, another episode of interna-
tional terrorism-the seizure of sixty-three American hostages
by Teheran students-demonstrated a new breakdown of inter-
national law that left the United States government virtually
helpless before Iranian terror-violence.' As a result,.serious ques-
tions were once again raised about the role and efficacy of the in-
ternational legal system.' To a less naive and more callous
generation, critics and commentators flatly declared that interna-
*Ph.D., Northwestern University (1963); J.D., DePaul University (1973).
Professor of Law, Ohio University College of Law.
1. See D. MCMANUS, FREE AT LAST! 5-18, 48-56 (1981); Newsweek, Dec. 3,
1979, at 44-55; Id., Nov. 26, 1979, at 34-49; U.S. News & World Report, Nov. 26,
1979, at 29-33; Newsweek, Nov. 19, 1979, at 61-75.
2. But see, Boyle, International Law in Time of Crisis: From the Entebbe
Raid to the Hostages Convention, 75 Nw. U.L. REW. 769, 848-54 (1980); Rubin,
How International Law Bolsters the US. Hand, The Christian Science Monitor,
Jan. 21, 1980, at 23, col. 1; Fisher, Helping the Iranians to Change Their Mind,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at 23, col. 1.
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tional law did not do the job for which it was intended.'
The truth of the matter is that during most of this century,
public international law has been deemed a failure whenever
challenged by power politics. August 1914, September 1939, and
the three-score global conflicts since 1945 give strong credence
to the charge that the operation of international law is largely ir-
relevant in the critical context of national self-interest. To
rephrase Clausewitz's famous dictum,4 war is as much the conse-
quence of the collapse of legal order as it is the result of public
policy.,
Nothing is more illustrative for the present nor more ominous
for the future than a review of the circumstances which brought
about the First World War. Despite scholar-commentators, such
as Henry A. Kissinger, who draw stark parallels between the
1930's and the present day, it was the era preceding World War
I that clearly demonstrates both the promise and the shortcom-
ings of public international law as a means of conflict resolution
within the world community. Admittedly, most historians and
analysts have paid little, if any, attention to the existence of an
international legal order before the Great War, except as it
related to diplomatic practice. Actually, law and diplomacy are
inextricably intertwined, although diplomats seldom acknowledge
it, historians fail to realize it, and legalists isolate their role,
thereby diminishing their impact. Law and history in moments of
crisis are appealed to with equal fervor, but neither has been a
determining factor in questions of political power and national
policy.
Legal scholars have long held that so-called modern interna-
tional law dates from the Treaty of Westphalia which concluded
the Thirty Years' War in 1648.6 But historically and legally, it is
more correct to say that although the state-oriented interna-
3. This argument was propounded even before the Iranian crisis. See, e.g.,
Rostow, The Role of International Law in International Politics, 12 ATL.
COMMUNITY Q. 500 (1975).
4. C. VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 87 (M. Howard and P. Paret trans. 1976)
("War is merely the continuation of policy by other means").
5. See generally R. ARON, PEACE AND WAR (R. Howard & A.B. Fox trans.
1966); G. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900-1950 (1952); H.J. MORGENTHAU,
POLITICS AMONG NATIONS (3d ed. 1963); G. SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER POLITICS
(3d ed. 1964).
6. See, e.g., Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L. L.
20, 29 (1948). Contra, F.H. HINSLEY, NATIONALISM AND THE INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM 83-84 (1973).
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tional legal order emerged at this historical moment, modern in-
ternational law in reality began with the Congress of Vienna in
1814-1815, which put an end to the French Revolution and
Napoleonic Wars. (Contemporary international law originated
with the promulgation of the United Nations Charter in June
1945.) The Vienna Congress symbolically ended the slave
trade-leaving its actual dissolution to individual governments,
internationalized waterways, reaffirmed Napoleon's emancipation
of the Jews, outlawed Bonaparte by introducing the concept of
war criminality, reconstructed the European state system, and
created a Concert of the Great Powers to deal with any future
threats to the preservation of world order. The Concert of
Europe, as this innovation came to be called, proved to be an
historic forerunner of our own century's League of Nations and
United Nations.'
Some analysts have seen the European Concert system as a
primitive international peacekeeping process,' while others have
either downplayed its significance or totally decried its perform-
ance.9 British Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh resolutely
declared in a famous State Paper dated May 5, 1820, that no
representative government could precipitately mix in the affairs
of other countries, "and the sooner such a Doctrine shall be
distinctly abjured, as forming in any Degree the Basis of our
Alliance, the better .... [T]his Country cannot, and will not, act
upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution ..... 10
7. Rostow, supra note 3, at 502, claims that "[tihe Concert of Europe, and
its occasional diplomatic Congresses, were ancestors of the Security Council of
the United Nations." Marshall, The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the U.N., in THE
STRATEGY OF DECEPTION: A STUDY IN WORLD-WIDE COMMUNIST TACTICS 430 (J.
Kirkpatrick ed. 1963), suggests that the U.N. could "be considered the fifth
League."
8. See A.J. GRANT & H. TEMPERLEY, EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH AND
TWENTIETH CENTURIES, 1789-1939 at 171-85 (5th ed. 1939) [hereinafter cited as
GRANT & TEMPERLEY]; H. KISSINGER, A WORLD RESTORED, 144-174 (1957); R.B.
MOWAT, THE EUROPEAN STATES SYSTEM 51-72 (2d ed. 1929); H. NICOLSON,
DIPLOMACY 72 (1939).
9. F. ARTZ, REACTION AND REVOLUTION, 1814-1832 at 110-18 (1934); I.
CLARK, REFORM AND RESISTANCE IN THE INTERNATIONAL ORDER 77-109 (1980);
H. NICOLSON, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 118-277 (1946); 5 P. RENOUVIN, HISTOIRE
DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES: LE XIXe SIECLE-DE 1815 'A 1871, at 42-58
(1954).
10. GRANT & TEMPERLEY, supra note 8, at 181 n.1. See also Vincent, The
Idea of Concert and International Order, 29 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 34, 48-49, 51
(1975).
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International law was largely irrelevant to the nineteenth cen-
tury, except in those few instances where it served a national
purpose or Great Power interest. Principal exceptions included
the Belgian neutrality guarantee, the neutralization of the
Turkish Straits, establishment of the International Red Cross,
the Union blockade of the Confederacy, the emergence of the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and the tentative
beginnings of an international arbitration court. As can readily
be seen, throughout most of that century, on matters of war and
peace, public international law counted for very little. If it was
not totally useless, it was not really very useful.
The fulcrum of international relations during the latter part of
the nineteenth century, as it had been since the Peace of
Westphalia, was the so-called balance of power. Westphalia stood
for the proposition that no one state should be permitted to
become more powerful than the emerging international commun-
ity, and this concept became intermixed with the very rudiments
of the European State System. For all intents and purposes, the
terms balance of power and minimal world order can be con-
sidered synonymous, and any attempt on the part of one power
to disrupt the general balance was met with force on the part of
the very community it sought to disrupt. This widely-held princi-
ple brought into being the coalitions which ultimately defeated
Louis XIV at the end of the seventeenth century and Napoleon I
at the beginning of the nineteenth century. However, the
restructuring of the alliance system at the end of the latter
period significantly transformed the balance of power theory
after the Franco-Prussian War into a precarious equilibrium of
two competing alliance structures.
Unhappily, in light of subsequent events, at the period this
transformation was slowly taking place, the undoubted self-
serving call for a conference on political terrorism by the new
government of Tsar Alexander III in 1881, following the
assassination of his father Alexander II, went unheeded by
everyone. Europe was more concerned over the nonexistent
danger of a Greater Bulgaria than it was about the actual
menace of anarchistic assassins." Yet, surprisingly, it was a
11. For the tawdry record of political assassination, see B. TUCHMAN. THE
PROUD TOWER 63-113 (1966); Friedlander, A New International Anarchy?
Sadat's Death in Historical Perspective, 2 TVI J. 8 (Nov. 1981); and G. BRENAN,
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second Russian initiative, this time under Tsar Nicholas II in
1898, that led to the calling of an international disarmament con-
ference in The Hague the very next year.
The First Hague Conference did not come to any resolution of
the disarmament question, thereby acting as a negative spur to
the armaments race. It did, however, establish a Permanent
Court of Arbitration, more popularly known as the Hague Court.
This was not a judicial tribunal in the literal sense, but merely a
list of 132 distinguished jurists from which contending state par-
ties could then select an arbitration panel. 2 Although simple in
design, the concept did work well enough so that up to the out-
break of World War I, eighteen disputes had been resolved by
arbitration panelists of the Hague Court. In fact, Andrew
Carnegie was so pleased with the idea that he furnished funds to
construct a Peace Palace at The Hague where the Court still
resides.
Another area in which some progress was made, and which
had ominous overtones for the future, was the agreement to set
up a Conference commission (one of three) to begin formulation
of the laws of war. The efforts of this group achieved fruition in
the rules formulated by the Second Hague Peace Conference of
1907. Also of concern for the coming decade was German opposi-
tion blatantly expressed, reinforced by a more subtle French
reluctance, which not only created procedural difficulties but
likewise prevented any meaningful agreements from being
reached. Historians have been rather callous in their assessment
of the 1899 Conference, since more often than not they generally
ignore the workings of the international legal process. 13
THE SPANISH LABYRINTH: AN ACCOUNT OF THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
BACKGROUND OF THE CIVIL WAR 57-77, 131-169 (1964) (informative discussion on
anarcho-syndicalist violence).
12. Each party appointed up to 4 persons on a general panel, and then
specific arbitrators were selected from the overall list.
13. See R. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE
THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 238 n.37 (1958) (consigns the work of the First Hague
Conference to a footnote); J. REMAK, THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR I, 1871-1914,
at 57 (1967) (frankly admits that the historical disinterest in the Hague Con-
ference stems from "the conventions of historiography which tend to deal with
crisis rather that normalcy, and to stress disaster over triumph."); 6 P.
RENOUVIN, HISTOIRE DES RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES: LE XIXe SIECLE-DE
1871 'A 1914, at 153 (1955) (calls the modest attainments of both Hague Con-
ferences "deceptive."); R. SCHNERB, LE XIXe SIECLE L'APOGEE DE L'EXPANSION
EUROPEENNE (1815-1914) at 537-38 (2d ed. 1955) (implies that the two Hague
19821
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The Second Hague Peace Conference of June-October 1907
concerned itself primarily with the laws of war. The precedent
for its thirteen conventions and one declaration was laid by its
predecessor which had prohibited the launching of projectiles
and explosives from balloons.1 The Russian program of 1898 had
been much more sweeping, and finally found expression in the
1907 agreements. On June 15, 1907, "256 delegates from 44 na-
tions met ... to ponder the future of the world."'5 Despite the
numerous agreements promulgated on October 18, 1907, the Con-
ference results were not well received by historians. One promi-
nent diplomatic scholar dismisses it out of hand, emphasizing "its
barrenness."'6 Another prestigious analyst observes that the
Conference must be given a failing grade on the principal ques-
tion of whether sanctions should be applied against an aggressor
state. Legalists, because of the significance of the development
of the laws of war, take a different and more favorable view.18
On the one hand, it might be argued that the real importance
of the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 lay in the formation
of a new framework for international cooperation and civilized
behavior, providing a significant step forward for the application
of peaceful resolutions to contentious transnational issues. On
the other hand, the Latin maxim si vis pacem para bellum"9
equally applies, because it can also be demonstrated that the
assembled delegates of the Great Powers in The Hague during
the summer and fall of 1907 drew up conventions dealing with
the laws of war in order to prepare for an impending Great
Power conflict. The Hague regulations governing the use of
armed force were a clear sign that the European balance was
shifting out of control and that the governments represented at
Conferences had approximately the same negative impact as the Pan American
Conferences of 1901 and 1910). Contra W. KUEHL, SEEKING WORLD ORDER 47
(1969) ("the Hague Conference of 1899 contributed substantially" to a growing
movement toward world organization).
14. 7 J.B. MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 205-06 (1906).
15. KUEHL, supra note 13, at 101.
16. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, supra note 13, at 254.
17. 6 RENOUVIN, supra note 13, at 153. Bury, International Relations,
1900-1912, in 12 THE NEW CAMBRIDGE MODERN HISTORY 325 (D. Thomson ed.
1960) (result of the 1907 Hague Conference "was merely to increase distrust.").
18. See, e.g., 1 A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 296-98,
320-24, 413-15 (M.C. Bassiouni & V. Nanda eds. 1973); Hudson, The Progressive
Codification of International Law, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 655, 655-56 (1926).
19. If you see peace, prepare for war.
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the Second Peace Conference were really anticipating a gen-
eralized European war.
It is indeed ironic that two years later in 1908, at the same
time as the Young Turk Revolution, and coincident with the
Bosnian Crisis between Russia and Austria-Hungary, a crisis oc-
curred in Morocco that brought about a German-French confron-
tation. The press of both countries was almost apoplectic in its
denunciation of one another and this, coupled with widespread
anxiety in England over the newly-announced German naval
build-up, provided the combustible elements for a general con-
flagration. But that did not occur, for to the surprise of many,
the French and German foreign ministers agreed to submit their
dispute to the Hague Court for arbitration. The facts of the case
were simple enough. Some German civilians in Casablanca, work-
ing with the German Consul there, persuaded eight members of
the French Foreign Legion (including two Germans, one Aus-
trian, and one French citizen of German origin) to desert. The
Consul clothed them, hid them, and on September 25, 1908, at-
tempted to ship them out on a German steamer. But the boat in
which they tried to reach the steamer capsized, they were forced
to return to shore, and upon so doing were arrested by French
soldiers. The German Consul immediately demanded the release
of the three German prisoners.
Originally, the German Government proposed arbitration, but
when France accepted, Berlin also demanded that the port
authorities be punished and that the release of the three German
deserters be guaranteed. Soon an additional demand was made
for compensation of two injured employees of the German Con-
sulate, who apparently were hurt while trying to prevent the ar-
rest of the others. Germany first threatened to recall its Am-
bassador when France would not concede, and then on Novem-
ber 6, 1908, made a last request for an official apology. The next
day the British and Russian Ambassadors informed the French
Foreign Ministry in Paris that they completely supported the
position of France. Two days later the Austrian Emperor urged
the German Kaiser, then visiting in Vienna, to arbitrate the mat-
ter and the Kaiser agreed. Both Germany and France signed a
subsequent statement regretting the events of September 25th
and announcing their intention to submit the matter to the
Hague Court. The decision of the Hague arbitration panel cen-
sured the actions of the German Consul and indicated that the
1982]
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French had acted correctly, except in using unnecessary violence
to arrest the Legionnaires."
The peaceful resolution of this grave international dispute led
the two participants to sign an agreement in February 1909
which ostensibly ended their confrontation over Morocco.
Germany recognized French political ascendancy, and France
promised Germany a share of her economic concessions. The
possibility of war had been averted, a d6tente between the two
Great Powers had come into being, and international law had
succeeded where the threat of force had failed. The lessons of
this episode were obvious if anyone wanted to heed them. No
one did. Two years later, in 1911, another Moroccan crisis occur-
red when, as the result of a series of internal disorders, troops
sent from France occupied the Moroccan capital of Fez, osten-
sibly to protect the lives of the foreign residents there. But in-
stead of following the requirements of self-help or the rules of
humanitarian intervention and removing the troops as soon as
order was restored, the French Government refused to withdraw
them."
The German Kaiser's initial reaction was atypical. He had
been especially pleased with the Franco-German d6tente, and
openly refused to admit there was a crisis. He even suggested,
"[W]e can leave it for the present to the other Powers, in the
first place Spain, to protest."2 But his ministers were angry that
France had not carried out the promises contained in the 1909
accord, and they saw in this situation a chance to humiliate
France by a symbolic show of force. The rest of the story is well-
known. A German gunboat, the Panther, was sent to Agadir.
Britain subsequently backed France. Before long, the Franco-
German crisis had been enlarged into an Anglo-German dispute.
Britain stepped up her naval armament program, killing what-
20. See G.P. GOOCH, HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE, 1878-1919, at 458-60
(1923). The most recent statement on the Casablanca Deserters can be found in
Schwarzenberger, Present-Day Relevance of the Hague Peace System:
1899-1979, 34 Y.B. OF WORLD AFF. 329, 331-33, 336 (1980). On the tangled rela-
tionship between finance and diplomacy in Moroccan affairs, see H. FEIS,
EUROPE: THE WORLD'S BANKER, 1870-1914, at 397-421 (1930).
21. Two prominent political scientists place the onus for the events that
were to follow squarely on France. "Plainly one French objective was to
humiliate Germany once again." G. SNYDER & P. DIESING, CONFLICT AMONG
NATIONS 91 (1977).
22. T. WOLFF, THE EVE OF 1914, at 48 (E.W. Dickes trans. 1936).
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ever remained of the spirit of The Hague, and the specter of war
reappeared. Conflict did not come because the potential con-
tenders still were not prepared to do battle. No one suggested
arbitration or any other legal procedure. A compromise was fash-
ioned whereby Morocco became a French protectorate and Ger-
many received two large but meaningless pieces of territory in
the French Congo.
The Franco-German detente had proved to be a chimera.
France deliberately breached the 1906 Algeciras settlement (to
which the United States was also a signatory), while Germany
felt betrayed and outmaneuvered. Her regard for international
agreements, never very strong, was now further diminished.
Significantly, when the storm of the summer of 1914 finally
broke, no government gave serious consideration to the interna-
tional legal process. In retrospect, the promising Declaration of
London (1909), intended as a follow-up to the Second Hague Con-
ference, dealing with contraband and neutral trade in time of
war, can also be viewed as a harbinger of conflict. The Great
Powers were in fact laying down the rules for the tests of
strength yet to come.
One should not assume however, that international law and
the international legal process had either been discarded or
dismantled by the Great Powers and Quasi-Powers. In the mid-
dle of the last decade of the nineteenth century, just a few years
before American imperialism came into its own, the United
States Supreme Court acknowledged the operation of interna-
tional law. Anticipating the language of Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice (1945), the Court observed
that "courts must obtain such aid as they can from judicial deci-
sions, from the works of jurists and commentators, and from the
acts and usages of civilized nations."' In one sense the United
States remained faithful to international legal principles, for
President Woodrow Wilson's request for a declaration of war
against the Central Powers on April 2, 1917, had as its fun-
damental premise the German violation of American neutrality.
Germany's attack upon neutral shipping (some of it armed),
Wilson declared in eloquent hyperbole, "is a warfare against
mankind. '4
23. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
24. S. Doc. No. 5, 65th Cong., 1st Sess., at 3-8 (1917).
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As the world entered the twentieth century, Imperial
Germany, along with the United States, had become a leading in-
dustrial power with new colonial territories and growing military
might. But the German attitude toward international law was
suspect, if not outright hostile. In collaboration with England,
France, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, Prussia and her successor,
Germany, had been co-guarantors of Belgian neutrality since the
creation of the modern Kingdom of Belgium. The infamous
Schlieffen Plan, named after Count Alfred von Schlieffen, head of
the German General Staff from 1901 to 1906, predicated a
German military victory over France on an invasion of neutral
Belgium. First formulated in 1899, the Schlieffen Plan was
broadened each successive year until its originator's retirement
in 1906. Although the Plan was first conceived almost as a
military gamble, it had hardened and rigidified into absolute
military doctrine by the summer of 1914. When Belgium refused
to permit the transit of German troops across Belgium after the
German declaration of war against France, Germany invaded
anyway, and 'England was given a pretext for entering the war
on the side of her erstwhile French ally.25
The Germans never did understand what all the commotion
was about with reference to the violation of Belgian neutrality.
In fact, German military leaders looked upon Belgian resistance
as contrary to international law," and the Kaiser himself tele-
graphed American President Woodrow Wilson, arguing that Bel-
gian opposition to the German invasion constituted a "criminal
and barbarous action," and therefore Germany was being vic-
timized by a "bloodthirsty population."' With this inverted kind
of thinking it is small wonder that the German Chancellor, von
Bethman-Hollweg, strenuously complained to the British Am-
bassador, who had demanded withdrawal of German troops from
25. The Paris Peace Conference Commission on War Responsibility in 1919
accused Germany and her allies of "premeditated" war. See Garner, Punish-
ment of Offenders Against the Laws and Customs of War, 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 70,
89 (1920). Cf. D. CALLEO, THE GERMAN PROBLEM RECONSIDERED 41 (1978) ("By
1912, the [German] General Staff began to advocate 'preventive' war"). F.
FISCHER, GERMANY'S AIMS IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR 29 (1967), agrees that
Germanleaders regarded "war with France and Russia as extremely likely, if
not imminent, and sometimes even as inevitable."
26. B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST 316 (1962).
27. Id. at 322.
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Belgium under threat of war, on August 4, 1914, that Britain was
"stabbing a man from behind while he was fighting for his life ... all
for just a word, neutrality, just for a scrap of paper."" No state
is going to abide by international law when faced with a threat
to its national survival. Germany, however; never stopped to con-
sider the legitimacy of other nations' claims when her own na-
tional interests were at stake.
When confronted with a might-is-right international order,
self-interest becomes paramount. In a memorandum, written on
May 29, 1901, the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Salisbury,
pointed out the difficulties a parliamentary government faces in
adhering to treaties of allegiance and, by implication, conven-
tions and agreements of international law. "I do not see how, in
common honesty," he wrote, "we could invite other nations to
rely upon our aid in a struggle which must be formidable and
probably supreme when we have no means whatever of knowing
what may be the humour of our people in circumstances that
cannot be foreseen."' This is, in effect, an updated reaffirmation
of Castlereagh's State Paper and reinforced Salisbury's own
equally famous dictum of "splendid isolation." Under his suc-
cessor, Sir Edward Grey, Britain became slowly enmeshed in the
network of European alliances and alignments, so that her
freedom of choice was gradually and unconsciously eroded.
Britain's leaders talked a great deal about principle, but many of
her activities in the Boer War were reprehensible," and Per-
fidious Albion, as she was commonly called, did not stand on
obligation when her best judgment indicated otherwise. Prior to
World War I, Britain's casual adherence to international law, as
compared with Germany's indifference, was one of degree rather
than of substance.
The next European war, Otto von Bismarck once predicted in
a fit of exasperation, would erupt over "[s]ome damned foolish
thing in the Balkans." 1 Actually, the two Balkan Wars of
1912-1913 revealed that the Great Powers had in fact lost control
28. G. M. THOMSON, THE TWELVE DAYS, 24 JULY To 4 AUGUST 1914, at 199
(1964). In modern parlance, what the Germans were claiming was the right of
anticipatory self-defense.
29. ALBRECHT-CARRIt, supra note 13, at 231 n.31.
30. See B. FARWELL, THE GREAT ANGLO-BOER WAR (1976); T. PAKENHAM,
THE BOER WAR (1979).
31. TUCHMAN, supra note 26, at 71.
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of their smaller allies and client states. The fading shadow of the
Concert of Europe had finally been laid to rest, and the Balkan
states in warring among themselves ignored both the wishes of
the European Powers acting together (for the last time) and the
desires of their particular Great Power masters. Balkan ter-
ritorial disputes were settled on the battlefield, and no one, at
the end, seemed to be severly injured. Even the virtual expul-
sion of the Turkish Ottoman Empire from Europe was con-
sidered to be a good thing. In a situation ominously reminiscent
of present-day realities, by 1914 Great Power governments were
becoming hostage to the policies of lesser allies and associates.
Room for maneuver was increasingly constrained, and it can
indeed be said that the European leaders lost control of their
own destinies long before the shots of June 28, 1914 rang out.
Political terrorism is not an invention of the current genera-
tion. Its historical roots go back as far as the ancient world, and
the assassination of the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand, heir to the
Austro-Hungarian Imperial throne, by a Serbian terrorist
organization called "The Black Hand" was merely a continuation
of the assassination politics of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.2 Presidents, Emperors, and Prime Ministers
had already fallen prey to assassins' bullets, so the murder of a
mere heir-apparent and his spouse was not extraordinary and
certainly not sufficient in itself to cause a world-wide upheaval.
Pro-Allied historians have argued that since Austria-Hungary
was unaware of the complicity of the Serbian government at the
time of the assassination, (its director of military intelligence was
the leader of the "Black Hand"), Austrian demands made upon
Serbia were aggressive and war-like. 4 But it was enough to show
32. See 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND
LOCAL CONTROL 9-10, 15-18, 30-31 (1979). The statements by Albrecht-Carri6,
supra note 13, at 323, that terrorists "sometimes succeed in accomplishing ends
that are widely desired" is egregious nonsense.
33. Cf. 6 RENOUVIN, supra note 13, at 366-67; A.J.P. TAYLOR, FROM
NAPOLEON To LENIN: HISTORICAL ESSAYS 155-57 (1966).
34. See, e.g., R. ARON, THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR 9-17 (1954); R.
RENOUVIN, LA CRISE EUROPEENNE ET LA PREMIERE GUERRE MONDIALE 198-214
(4th ed. 1962); M. SCHETTINI, ESTATE 1914: DAL DRAMMA DI SARAJEVO ALLA
GUERRA 100, 114-15 (1966). A.J.P. TAYLOR, POLITICS IN WARTIME 70 (1964)
(uniquely asserts that the head of the Black Hand never really envisioned a suc-
cessful assassination. He "wanted a scandal, not a murder."). But see Dedijer,
Serajevo Fifty Years After, 42 FOREIGN AFF. 569, 569 (1964) ("no other political
[Vol. 20:569
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that the assassins were Serbian nationals and that they had ob-
tained their weapons in Belgrade. Circumstantial evidence
pointed directly to Serbia, and "[s]carcely anyone disputed the
right of Austria-Hungary to impose moderate demands."'
A new breed of German historians has been debating for
almost two decades the primacy of German responsibility in the
coming of World War I, claiming at the very least that Germany
must bear the "overwhelming share" of the blame." From the
available sources, and they are massive, the judgment is
somewhat harsh (probably a reaction against the rather taboo
subject of World War II in German historiography). What can be
said, however, is that German intransigence 7 forestalled the
mediation proposals of Britain' and Russia39 during July 24-27,
which were half-hearted efforts at best. Serbia had gone a long
way toward accepting the Austrian demands on July 25th, not
only offering to abolish the "Black Hand" (of which by now
everyone was aware) and thereby admitting some measure of
complicity, but more importantly suggesting reference of the
entire dispute to the International Tribunal at the Hague. Sadly,
by this time international law was entirely out of the picture, if
it had ever been in focus at all.
On July 27, less than a week before the outbreak of the Euro-
pean war, Germany's Foreign Minister had impliedly rejected
mediation, because it "would practically amount to a court of ar-
bitration."'" German inability to comprehend the strictures of
legality no doubt increased her share of the burden of guilt. In
his last meeting with the British Ambassador after the British
Declaration of War, the German Chancellor expressed his bewil-
derment that England should go to war "just for the sake of the
murder in modern history has had such momentous consequences"). C.R.M.F.
CRUTTWELL, A HISTORY OF THE GREAT WAR, 1914-1918, at 4 (2d ed. 1936) (notes
that the Chief of the Austrian Staff "presented his master with a proposal for
war every spring with the regularity of an almanac.").
35. I. GEISS, JULY 1914, at 55 (1967).
36. 1I at 367. FISCHER, supra note 25, at 63, claims that Germany "took the
risk of war with open eyes."
37. GEISS, supra note 35, at 253. The German Kaiser's view of Serbia as not
being a state but merely a band of robbers parallels the American government's
view of Iran on Nov. 21, 1979, as being run by gangsters.
38. Id. at 183-84, 252.
39. Id at 230.
40. Id at 203-04. See FISCHER, supra note 25, at 64-69.
41. GEISS, supra note 35, at 253.
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neutrality of Belgium. He looked upon England as entirely re-
sponsible for what might now happen."42
War occurred in August, 1914, because the Great Powers and
their peoples were ready and eager for conflict. "Delirious eu-
phoria" upon announcement of the war declarations gripped all
populations, who thus embarked upon "the great seminal catas-
trophe of this century" 4 with lighthearted enthusiasm. Inter-
national law was so greatly misunderstood that German Chan-
cellor Bethmann-Hollweg could complain, following the outbreak
of hostilities, that dividends to German shareholders were being
illegally withheld by the Allied countries!' But, then, one-half
century later, a widely respected diplomatic historian still was
observing that the "rule of law among [sovereign states] remains
in the last analysis a contradiction. 45
Every Great Power (including the United States) practiced the
politics of confrontation during the Crisis Decade of 1904-1914.
Virtually no one foresaw a war of long duration, few conceived of
a global conflict, and almost everyone believed that a test of
strength between the Great Powers was inevitable. In this situa-
tion there was no room for law and little room for compromise."
It is true in part that the Great Power leaders had not under-
stood the nature of modern technological warfare, and after they
42. Id at 360 (emphasis added).
43. G. KENNAN, THE DECLINE OF BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN ORDER, FRANCO-
RUSSIAN RELATIONS, 1875-1890, at 3-4 (1979). See also ARON, supra note 34, at
25 ("The start of the first war was marked in all countries by an explosion of
national fervor"). See generally, R. WOHL, THE GENERATION OF 1914 (1979).
CALLEO, supra note 25, at 32, remarks: "The more the diplomatic historian un-
winds the motives, perceptions, and interests of the major actors .... the more
a general war seems inevitable." 0. HALE, THE GREAT ILLUSION, 1900-1914, at
285, 314 (1971), emphasizes the lack of competence and inferior abilities of
"second-rate statesmen" from every contending country. S.L.A. MARSHALL, THE
AMERICAN HERITAGE HISTORY OF WORLD WAR I, at 31 (1964), assigns equal
blame to "diplomats and strategists." J. STOESSINGER, WHY NATIONS Go To WAR
30 (1974), complains of "the overwhelming mediocrity of the personalities in-
volved."
44. GEISS, supra note 35, at 13.
45. ALBRECHT-CARRIE, supra note 13, at 308.
46. Even the pre-war peace movements were religiously rather than
legally oriented. See P. BROCK, PACIFISM IN EUROPE To 1914 (1972). Contra
Kahler, Rumors of War: The 1914 Analogy, 58 FOREIGN AFF. 374, 391 (1979)
("Liberal peace societies flourished, and the years before 1914 were marked by
growing interest in the procedures of international arbitration and law"). Kah-
ler's description is at best an overstatement.
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issued mobilization orders, the generals inherited the decision-
making powers from the politicians. But most governments were
indeed aware that once mobilization had occurred, it represented
de facto conflict. The instruments of war were not intended to be
subject to the rules of law.
When the Great War had spent its course, Woodrow Wilson's
proposal for an Association of Nations was certainly an admis-
sion that modern international law had ceased to function in time
of crisis. Though he actually was referring to domestic issues,
Mr. Justice Brandeis, writing one and a half decades after Sera-
jevo, might well have been commenting on the problems of main-
taining minimum world order: "If the Government becomes a
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; ... it invites anarchy." 7
Wilson's vision proved to be imperfect, and his League of Na-
tions offspring suffered the same fate. Wilson's implacable adver-
sary, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, whose advocacy of a League
of Great Powers carried the concept of the European Concert
into the twentieth century, was more in tune with the times. 8
But international organizations and procedural mechanisms can-
not surmount the failure to create proper legal standards. A
great twentieth-century philosopher once observed that those
who ignore the mistakes of the past are doomed to repeat them. 9
If we cannot perpetuate the light of civilized conduct in the world
community, the lamps of civilization may again be extin-
guished-and who knows for how long?
47. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting).
48. See J. GARRATY, HENRY CABOT LODGE 343-48, 360 (1953); D.M. SMITH,
THE GREAT DEPARTURE 183-185 (1965). Britian, at the Paris Peace Conference in
1919, first advocated a League of Nations Council composed solely of the Great
Powers. F. MORLEY, THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS: ITS ORGANIZATION AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT 339-341 (1932).
49. 1 G. SANTAYANA, THE LIFE OF REASON, OR THE PHASES OF HUMAN
PROGRESS 284 (1906). If Great Power Politics supplied the powder for the 1914
explosion, self-determination provided the fuse. Yet, according to Richard Hig-
gins, Member, Committee on Combatting Terrorism, U.S. Dept. of State, "self-
determination is the primary motivating cause of terrorism in the world today."
Speech to the 7th Annual Human Rights Day Conference, World Without War
Council, Chicago, Illinois, Dec. 8, 1980. The web of global violence has spun full
circle since the shots rang out at Serajevo.
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